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SYMPOSIUM NOTE: BLANK CHECK IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Friday, February 3, 2017, at the University of Denver Sturm Col-
lege of Law, Professor Gabriel J. Chin, from the University of California 
Davis, spoke at the Denver Law Review Symposium on Justice Reinvest-
ment. Prof. Chin incorporated an article he is currently writing for the Den-
ver Law Review into his presentation titled, Blank Check in the Criminal 
Justice System. The presentation focused on the power sharing issue af-
fecting players in the criminal justice system.  
Prof. Chin begins by explaining he believes the state and federal gov-
ernments spend far too much money on the criminal justice system but 
even with “political will” it is going to be incredibly difficult to change the 
system and accomplish the reform desired by so many individuals.1 The 
issues surrounding this desired reform are the main takeaways from the 
presentation.  
In discussing the structural issues in the criminal justice system, Prof. 
Chin emphasized three main points: (1) there is no criminal justice system; 
(2) the system is afflicted by the “free lunch problem”; and (3) there is a 
“blank check problem” in the system.2 
II. THERE IS NO CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The first point Prof. Chin emphasized was there is no criminal justice 
system. Using California as an example, he explained how one of the big-
gest costs for the state is state prisons3 and that the California Department 
of Corrections has no control over its population.4 Inmates are sent to the 
facilities by independently elected judges, and the charges that put these 
inmates in front of the judges are brought by independently elected prose-
cutors.5 Going even further, prosecutors get their cases from agencies such 
as the municipal police department, the county sheriff, and any local office 
of the state police.6 The issue is in many states there is no one in charge of 
the system because each player in the system can do what they chose.7 For 
  
 1. Gabriel J. Chin, Univ. of Cal., Davis Coll. of L., Speech at the Univ. of Den. L. Rev. Sym-
posium: Justice Reinvestment, The Solution to Mass Incarceration? (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 2. Id.  
 3. California’s prison spending is out of whack. L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 14, 2016) 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-de-incarceration-dividend-20160114-story.html; 
Chin, supra note 1.  
 4. Chin, supra note 1.  
 5. Chin, supra note 1.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
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example, Prof. Chin explained how a district attorney could not dictate the 
actions of the county sheriff, nor can a superior court judge dictate the 
actions of the attorney general.8 Although Prof. Chin conceded that having 
independent elections is important to retaining the states independent 
source of power, he also pointed out that the elected officials are not re-
sponsible to each other nor do they follow one overarching policy regard-
ing the goals of the state’s criminal justice system.9 Thus, each player is 
given the ability to incentivize their own re-election.10  
Next, Prof. Chin suggested an alternative to the unfettered discretion 
given to players and agencies in the state system. In the federal system for 
example, the U.S. attorney general is in charge of, among other things, the 
local U.S. attorney’s in the county who file charges; the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; 
and the United States Marshall Service.11 Thus, Prof. Chin suggested that 
in principle the attorney general can set priorities for a system as a whole 
and monitor the number of people incarcerated.12 However, Prof. Chin as-
serted, in state systems the broad range of independently elected players 
lead to the “free lunch problem.”13  
III. THE FREE LUNCH PROBLEM 
After acknowledging speakers at the Denver Law Review Justice Re-
investment Symposium who spoke on Thursday, February 2, in greater 
length on this topic, Prof. Chin described the “free lunch problem” as a 
way players in the criminal justice system may chose to internalize bene-
fits for themselves while forcing others to pay for those benefits.14 For 
example, a city police officer can make an arrest that results in a financial 
cost for the county sheriff for detention; the county prosecutor can charge 
an individual for a crime, paid for by the state;15 a police officer can decide 
whether to issue a ticket or make a full custodial arrest;16 the district attor-
ney can offer a plea bargain of one year or three years for the same of-
fense.17 Prof. Chin conceded that although the discretion given to players 
in the criminal justice system is important, the district attorney offering 
the three-year plea deal as opposed to the one-year deal and the police 
officer making significantly more arrests than his or her colleague do not 
  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Chin, supra note 1.  
 11. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-147(1).  
 12. Chin, supra note 1.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion: A Comparative Perspective, 64 Ind. L.J. 873 
(1989).  
 17. Chin, supra note 1.  
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have to worry about the increased financial cost of incarceration or pro-
cessing.18 The issue with this flexibility, Prof. Chin suggested, means each 
individual player can have and carry out her own criminal justice policy.19 
IV. THE BLANK CHECK PROBLEM 
After laying the foundation discussed in parts II and III, Prof. Chin 
described his main focus of the presentation—the blank check problem in 
the criminal justice system—as the system’s built in diffusion of power. 
Prof. Chin argued this diffusion of power is difficult to control because the 
distribution of law enforcement power is exceptionally wide.20 For exam-
ple, Colorado makes many individuals peace officers, and these peace of-
ficers have the power to, among other things, arrest,21 sign a summons and 
complaint,22 and execute warrants.23 A Colorado statute lists numerous 
categories, beyond what one would think of as general law enforcement 
agencies, that can act as a peace officer.24 Some of these people include 
the Commissioner of Agriculture and members of the Public Utilities 
Commission.25 Prof. Chin went further by explaining how the Colorado 
Supreme Court authorized peace officers of any jurisdiction throughout 
the state to investigate and arrest individuals if the peace officer is working 
on crimes that took place in their jurisdiction.26 Additionally, although 
some federal police officers are in the category of a peace officer, if the 
federal officer is not, all federal law enforcement officers who are author-
ized to make arrests are authorized to make arrests for any crime that takes 
place in their presence, but these officers are not under state authority.27 
Prof. Chin next described how Colorado law allows a sharing of 
power between state and federal prosecutors. As discussed above, Colo-
rado gives federal authorities the power to arrest and investigate cases for 
the state, and federal law grants authority to state players to enforce federal 
law.28 The danger with this power sharing is that just as federal prosecutors 
can be made state district attorneys and prosecute cases in state court,29 
state prosecutors can be made federal prosecutors and prosecute cases in 
  
 18. Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors Control 
the Jails?, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 677 (2016) (“explaining how prosecutors do not have to internalize 
the costs of their sentencing decisions); Chin, supra note 1.  
 19. Chin, supra note 1.   
 20. Chin, supra note 1.  
 21. Chin, supra note 1; see generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102. 
 22. Chin, supra note 1; see generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2-104. 
 23. Chin, supra note 1; see generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-105(5). 
 24. Chin, supra note 1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-143. 
 25. Chin, supra note 1; see generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-143. 
 26. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 200 (Colo. 1984) abrogated by People v. Begay, 2014 CO 
41, 325 P.3d 1026 on other grounds).   
 27. Chin, supra note 1.  
 28. Id.; see generally United States v. Cook, 794 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining 
how two state police officers were appointed as Special Deputy United States Marshals.))  
 29. Chin, supra note 1; see generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-201(c). 
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federal court.30 As a result, even though the Attorney General is at the head 
of the federal system, and even if there were someone at the top of the 
Colorado system, given the power sharing previously described, control 
would be almost impossible.31 
Prof. Chin finished by explaining how the “blank check problem” 
could affect Colorado specifically. For example, he described that alt-
hough marijuana may be legal on the state level, state police officers, act-
ing under their special federal power, can make arrests and take that case 
to federal court.32 Further, even if the federal court has no desire to prose-
cute a minor marijuana case, the U.S. Attorney’s Office can appoint an 
assistant district attorney to prosecute the case in federal court.33 Thus, 
Prof. Chin asserted, in principle, neither the United States nor Colorado 
can remove their police officers and prosecutors from areas simply by de-
criminalizing the conduct and how individual rights that one level of gov-
ernment might create can be evaded by shopping between the state and 
federal system.34  
V. CONCLUSION 
Prof. Chin, throughout his presentation, emphasized that having the 
political will to reform the criminal justice system is not enough given the 
massive flexibility given to law enforcement bodies and the power sharing 
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